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Due to a lack of religious or metaphysical orientation in modern West-
ern societies, interpersonal conflicts of interest and value are solved 
under the premise of individuals acting rationally through the interac-
tion on a free market and the formation of political majorities gaining 
legislative power. However, the legitimacy of this approach becomes 
increasingly questionable when it comes to sustainability conflicts. In 
view of this, Hans Jonas considered the possibility of the need to sus-
pend democratic institutions in favor of a benevolent tyrant to avert a 
potential catastrophe. Since any form of centralism comes with its own 
problems of legitimacy, utilizing the more modest orientation claims 
of prudence ethics is a more promising alternative in deliberations on 
the justifiability of an occasional suspension of the majority principle 
without exposing a society to the dangers of domineering arbitrariness.
Demokratisches Mehrheitsprinzip in Gefahr?
Das Beispiel Nachhaltigkeitskonflikte
Aufgrund fehlender religiös-metaphysischer Orientierung werden inter-
personelle Interessen- und Wertkonflikte in modernen Gesellschaften 
unter der Prämisse rational handelnder Individuen durch die Interak-
tion auf freien Märkten und die Bildung politischer Mehrheiten gelöst. 
Dieser Ansatz sieht sich jedoch bei Nachhaltigkeitskonflikten mit Legi-
timationsproblemen konfrontiert. Angesichts dessen zog Hans Jonas 
die Möglichkeit in Betracht, dass demokratische Institutionen zuguns-
ten eines wohlwollenden Tyrannen suspendiert werden müssten, um 
eine mögliche Katastrophe abzuwenden. Jede Form von Zentralismus 
bringt jedoch ihre eigenen Legitimationsprobleme mit sich. Deshalb 
ist die Operationalisierung der bescheideneren Orientierungsansprü-
che der Klugheitsethik eine erfolgversprechendere Alternative in Be-
ratungen über die Rechtfertigbarkeit einer gelegentlichen Aufhebung 
des Mehrheitsprinzips, ohne dabei eine Gesellschaft den Gefahren herr-
schender Willkür auszusetzen.
Keywords: sustainability, practical philosophy, conflict management
Introduction
Conflicts are nothing unusual for modern societies that can no 
longer rely on religious or metaphysical traditions to guide col-
lective action. Democratically organized Western industrial so-
cieties deal with conflicts under the premise of purpose-rational 
individuals through the interplay of market events and the for-
mation of political majorities gaining legislative power. This 
takes place against the background of a Constitution that guar-
antees basic rights for the individual, so that the inferior parties 
in the power struggle will not be discriminated. These in turn ac-
cept the framework of action enforced by the majority because 
of the possibility of being able to determine legislation in the 
future by forming their own majorities (Rawls 1971, pp. 390–
392). However, the current implementation of the majority prin-
ciple reveals legitimation deficits. These are mainly due to a 
loss of deliberation oriented towards the common good in fa-
vor of bargaining oriented towards individual interests (Flaig 
2014, pp. 379–380). Especially if we look at the problem of sus-
tainability, which is extremely broad in terms of space and time, 
weaknesses in this approach become apparent.
For example, the issues to be negotiated are usually so com-
plex that it is difficult to orientate oneself towards purposeful, 
rational action. Furthermore, a lack of motivation for sustaina-
ble action can be identified, which is due to conflicts between 
short-term individual interests and long-term goals of sustain-
able development. In the face of such problems, the question 
can be asked whether majorities are justified in taking decisions 
against the will of minorities when it comes to issues of sustain-
ability. Hans Jonas, for instance, expressed his concern, as early 
as 1979, that a democratic majority principle might not be suit-
able for imposing on itself the measures that the threatening fu-
ture demands (Jonas 1979, p. 262). In this context, he discusses 
the potential advantages of a tyranny that in our context must 
be a benevolent, well-informed tyranny inspired by the right in-
sight. Even if Jonas concludes that Marxism, for him the most 
promising manifestation of such a regime, fails because of its 
utopian elements, the desire for such an “eco-dictatorship” per-
sists stubbornly1.
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To clarify why we even bother to make decisions based on 
majorities, I will first briefly discuss the discourse-ethical justi-
fication of the majority principle and its application in technol-
ogy assessment (TA). In view of the already mentioned prob-
lems regarding sustainability issues, I will then turn to the sup-
posed (technical) advantages of centralized governance. Here, 
I will focus on the inability of such an approach to deal ade-
quately with normative and epistemic uncertainties of sustain-
ability issues. Having shown that an occasional suspension of 
majority decisions cannot be justified in this way, I will finally 
propose a promising alternative based on prudence-ethical ar-
guments.
The majority principle
The majority principle is a term historically rooted in the philo-
sophy of the state and today in political science and law. Con-
sequently, in voting, opinion-forming processes, elections, etc., 
the whole is subject to the will of the greater part. The major-
ity principle has a strong affinity for democratic structures be-
cause of the accumulation of equal votes from all those affected 
by a decision. In the discussion on parliamentary democracy, 
the absolute majority principle applied within a constitutional 
order was identified as the relatively closest approximation to 
the idea of freedom and optimal protection of even minorities 
(Rawls 1971).
From Aristotle to the French Enlightenment and Kant, there 
were numerous attempts to make the recourse to the majority 
principle in decision-making plausible. The discussion about 
participation and democratization after the emergence of dis-
course ethics gave the majority principle another boost. Since 
the Habermasian approach to discourse ethics has been highly 
influential, especially in TA since the 1990s, I want to dive a lit-
tle bit deeper into the argument for the majority principle given 
in this line of reasoning.
Discourse ethics stands in the tradition of Immanuel Kant’s 
moral philosophy and thus sees the nominal validity of laws or 
norms of action as the basic phenomenon in need of explana-
tion. Instead of the categorical imperative, however, here the 
procedure of moral argumentation takes its place. Accordingly, 
1    Significant authors in the past were Arne Naess, Val Plumwood, Robin 
 Eckersley, Rudolf Bahro. Recently, such elements have been taken up in the 
 post-growth economy (Paech 2014).
only those norms may claim validity that could find the agree-
ment of all those concerned as participants in a practical dis-
course (Habermas 1986, p. 17). At the same time, the categor-
ical imperative is reinterpreted in terms of a principle of uni-
versalization, which states that the consequences of a general 
adherence to a norm must be able to be accepted by everyone 
without compulsion. According to Habermas, the claim of uni-
versal validity of discourse ethics in the face of plural offers of 
orientation can be derived from the presuppositions of our lan-
guage, which must always be recognized implicitly in discourse 
and are therefore inescapable. As stated by discourse ethicists, 
only those discourses that fulfil the prerequisites of communica-
tion such as freedom of domination, well-informedness, equal-
ity and so on, have the legitimatory power to generate a norma-
tive agreement.
Trying to see questions of TA as an application of discourse 
ethics, one encounters some difficulties as we are no longer con-
cerned merely with controversial claims of validity with regard 
to the correctness of standards of action, but with the appropri-
ateness of values (Habermas 1981, pp. 39–45). In this context, 
the German philosopher Konrad Ott draws attention to some 
particularities that require a conceptual specification of dis-
course ethics’ basic idea (Ott 2001, pp. 53–59). As a result, in 
real discourses the achievement of compromises that can be ac-
cepted by the majority rather than consensus is to be expected. 
Therefore, a decision based on a majority principle, insofar as 
these (compromises) come about under discourse conditions, 
appears to be the most plausible way to decide from a discourse 
ethicist’s point of view, as it is the closest possible approxima-
tion to the ideal procedure (Renn et  al. 2007, p. 180). Conse-
quently, the evaluation of socio-technical options for action in 
TA is often carried out based on a multi-criteria decision anal-
ysis, which has been preceded by a discursive process that is 
highly influenced by Habermasian discourse ethics2.
However, when it comes to the issue of sustainability, weak-
nesses in this approach can be identified, especially due to the 
spatial and temporal extension of the respective problems. In 
particular, the promise that an ecologically oriented minority 
could determine politics or the evaluation of socio-technical op-
tions for action in the future by forming majorities becomes 
questionable considering the structural results of current ac-
2   An example is the recently completed Kopernikus project “ENavi”, 
which was funded by the German government to evaluate possible coal exit 
paths (Gaschnig et al. 2020). 
In real discourses the achievement of compromises  
 that can be accepted by the majority rather than consensus  
 is to be expected.
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tions, which sometimes irreversibly limit the scope for future 
action. This might lead to growing authoritarian tendencies, es-
pecially among young people who see their future possibility to 
act threatened by today’s majority opinion3.
The elitist approach
Historically, an attack on the majority principle has a long tradi-
tion from Plato to Machiavelli and Tocqueville to socialist crit-
icism. And indeed, it could be argued that, given high approval 
ratings for more sustainable and environmentally friendly pol-
icies (Wolf 2020), there is simply a lack of appropriate means 
of enforcement. From this it is then sometimes deduced in the 
public ecological discourse that benevolent tyrants, inspired by 
the right insight into our responsibility for the future, are the 
only possible answer to an impending environmental catastro-
phe. Behind all of this lies the Platonic idea, that one only needs 
to know the good to do good. In this context, the German phi-
losopher of technology Christoph Hubig already reminded us 
in 1996, in the discussion about the so-called “Leitbild” of sus-
tainability, of Aristotle’s criticism of this way of thinking (Hu-
big 1996). Regarding the potential call for a government of ex-
perts, I consider it appropriate to bring this criticism to mind.
In principle, the criticism is about the idea that the recogni-
tion of a general mission statement initially yields nothing for 
practical implementation. Rather, we find ourselves in three fur-
ther problem areas: The problem of bridging the gap, the prob-
lem of interpretation and the problem of weighing up conflict-
ing models. In the following, I want to show this by briefly re-
capturing the controversy of different concepts of sustainability 
and their operationalization.
As mentioned above, nowadays there is a broad consensus 
that we have a responsibility towards future generations in re-
spect of valuable natural resources (general mission statement). 
However, the matter becomes less clear with regard to the na-
ture of this responsibility and the question of what we owe fu-
ture generations to preserve (Grunwald and Kopfmüller 2012, 
pp. 31–75). The reason for this lies in (normative and epistemic) 
uncertainties that lead  – unlike “conventional conflicts”  – to 
“wicked problems” (Norton 2005, pp. 132–138) and a multitude 
of conflicting conceptualizations of sustainability. This problem 
of interpretation results from unclarified basic concepts, which 
are present in the general mission statement itself. The conflict 
between weak and strong sustainability is particularly promi-
nent in this context4.
The core thesis of the weak sustainability concept is that a 
summative-aggregated preservation of all of society’s  capital 
3   The environmental movement “Extinction Rebellion”, for example, is said 
to have such tendencies.
4   It would also be possible at this point to address the discussion between the 
Greifswald approach of strong sustainability and the Helmholtz Association’s in-
tegrative concept of sustainable development. However, I consider the chosen  ▶
stocks is sufficient to fulfil the responsibility for the future. 
Since it is claimed that we know nothing about the preferences 
of future generations beyond certain basic needs and that dif-
ferent types of capital are fundamentally substitutable, future 
generations could only accuse us of lowering the level of wel-
fare economics (Solow 1991). These assumptions are disputed 
by supporters of stronger sustainability concepts. A first limita-
tion of the concept of weak sustainability is the relevance of a 
basic stock of natural capital that is indispensable for economic 
welfare. This results in the position of an ecological economy 
(Pearce and Barbier 2000). A further restriction of the weak sus-
tainability concept is made from a scientific-cybernetic perspec-
tive regarding the preservation of the assimilation ability of eco-
logical systems to changing environmental conditions as a regu-
lator of evolution (Holling 1978). However, the concept of weak 
sustainability is most restricted from an environmental-ethical 
perspective regarding the preservation of natural capital as a nec-
essary condition for the continuation of human autonomy and its 
axiological significance (Ott 2020).
The dispute about an appropriate conception of the idea of 
sustainable development reveals conflicts of value and shows 
that the good is not a generic term that can be differentiated into 
various class-forming sub-concepts. The fact that many things 
are good or bad in different ways forces us to weigh up in each 
concrete case (Hubig 1996, p. 230). In addition to competing 
views on material and non-material values, resulting from a pre-
liminary decision in favor of a certain value theory, the first rel-
evant question in this context is what the notion of value actu-
ally means. If different ways of speaking of value are neglected, 
one-sidedness of objectivist and subjectivist theories of value 
arise (Christen 2013, pp. 139–166), which contradict moral in-
tuitions and thus reduce the prospect of successful conflict res-
olution. Furthermore, there is additional potential for conflict 
within a certain sustainability concept when it comes to the 
specification of values in criteria and indicators (Hubig 2016). 
This brings us to the bridging the gap problem that arises for 
those who want to apply a recognized principle to certain can-
didates.
Hubig shows in his article from 1996 that, due to normative 
and epistemic uncertainties, theoretically justifiable solutions 
for sustainability problems are not in sight and that a mecha-
nism for their practical implementation cannot be based on un-
problematic, technically justified procedures either. Therefore, 
ways must be developed to deal with these uncertainties. The 
elitist approach to sustainability problems thus lags far behind 
the level of reflection in the discourse-ethical debate, which ex-
plicitly recognizes the existence of a well-founded pluralism of 
values.
▶  examples to be more purposeful for my line of argument, which aims to high-
light value conflicts between the concepts. Incidentally, I follow the  assessment 
of Armin Grunwald, who considers a comparison between Greifswald and 
 Helmholtz to be difficult, since each of these approaches seemingly tries to 
 contribute to different discourses (Grunwald 2016, pp. 121–138).
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acter of action (in an Aristotelian sense)5. This puts prudence 
ethics up against a position which is merely oriented towards 
functionality for the realization of certain purposes like in util-
ity-based approaches (poiesis). Therefore, it provides important 
aspects of decision making, also and especially in the socio-po-
litical framework, and finds its perfection in (democratic) states-
manship that ensures that future (democratic) statesmanship re-
mains possible (Jonas 1979, p. 214).
Consequently, discourses on the design of technology in TA 
must, from the perspective of prudence ethics, ensure the pos-
sibility of a dynamic continuation of the reflective equilibrium 
between the assessment of facts, moral intuitions, and justifica-
tions. This is realizable if higher-level values act as regulatory 
principles in the evaluation of socio-technical options for action 
that prevent internal tensions in the field of conflict from lead-
ing to contradictions (Hubig 2007, p. 150).
A prudence-ethical approach
In modern prudence ethics, majority compromises as an ap-
proximation to the discourse-ethical ideal of consensual agree-
ment are regarded merely as a pragmatic stopgap for maintaining 
political peace. However, such compromises are not a genuine 
conflict resolution since numerous negative aspects of the com-
peting options for action continue virulently in the agreement 
reached. As Hans Jonas correctly stated, this leads to legitima-
tion problems, especially when compromises endanger the con-
ditions of the possibility of responsible action. Instead of now 
demanding a benevolent and insightful elite as a solution to the 
problem of responsibility for the future and thus exposing them-
selves to the danger of centralist errors, prudence ethicists are fo-
cusing on the greatest possible preservation of pluralism of val-
ues, in order to preserve a society’s ability to shape itself in the 
face of changing problems.
Prudence ethics therefore considers the prohibition of op-
tions for action justified only when risks of a particularly large 
extent can be avoided.6 However, we often do not have to deal 
5   E. g. self-restraint in the  context of sustainability.
6   Jonas argues for a similar principle when he calls for uncertainties to 
be treated as certainties in such cases (Jonas 1979, p. 81). The  precautionary 
principle, which is the federal law applicable in Germany (Art. 34 Abs. 1 EV, 
 Einigungsvertrag), can be read in a similar way. The respective basic intention 
is that the treatment of uncertainty itself is not in itself uncertain but is both 
a prudent advice and (in this case) an undeniable imperative.
Other orientation possibilities in view 
of a well-founded pluralism
In view of orientation deficits of duty-based ethics (like dis-
course ethics) in dealing with concrete problems, prudence eth-
ics tries to take a different approach. In general, prudence is the 
ability of an individual or institutional actor to act in a reasona-
ble and considered manner appropriate to the situation. An actor 
is called prudent if he can do so even in seemingly unmanage-
able situations. It is also prudent to put one’s own goals to the 
disposal, if these threaten to come into conflict with an overall 
good life. In contrast to the concept of prudence as the principle 
of rational egoism, which is often used today in ethics in disso-
ciation from morality, this quality is an ability, which is called 
virtue when it has solidified into an attitude. It is the irreducible 
situation- and actor-specific knowledge about advice, which in-
cludes not only true and properly justified moral and legal (i. e. 
strongly normative) convictions, but also true and well-founded 
weakly normative convictions with regard to well-being or the 
good life. Here, of course, an ‘ought to be’ appears only with a 
hypothetical claim, as it is characteristic for the advice of pru-
dence (Luckner 2005, pp. 39–45).
Like (material) virtue ethics, prudence ethics does not take its 
starting point in norm-founding procedures, but in an investiga-
tion of the self-orientation competence of individuals. It differs, 
however, in that it seeks to reconstruct the formal conditions of 
successful practice instead of referring to the virtues of a spe-
cific community of values. These conditions of successful prac-
tice were first discussed in the Aristotelian analysis of phrónê-
sis, which is the virtue responsible for an overall good life (eu-
praxia). Although Aristotelian prudence requires general value 
patterns as they are found as normative frameworks in the re-
spective cultural and historical situations, prudence itself is not 
bound to certain value contents. The prudent individual rather 
relates to certain values by considering and weighing up how 
the continuation of action can be guaranteed in the face of situ-
ational conflicts of values. The ethics of prudence can therefore 
also be described as a formal virtue ethics which forms an im-
portant actor-centered alternative to the strongly normative eth-
ics, especially under value pluralistic conditions (Hubig 2007, 
pp. 127–137).
Due to its openness of content, it is also not limited to indi-
vidual ethics. The basic “concepts” of prudent action, like the 
situational appropriateness from the perspective of maintaining 
and developing the ability to act, emphasize the practical char-
Discourses on the design of technology in TA must ensure  
 the  possibility of a dynamic continuation of the reflective equilibrium 
 between the  assessment of facts, moral intuitions, and justifications.
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with decisions of such magnitude when it comes to sustainabil-
ity conflicts. Therefore, further situation-dependent strategies 
are needed to deal with well-founded dissent about the design of 
sustainable development. In this context, Christoph Hubig has 
proposed some strategies for dealing with dissent7 in his major 
ethical work (Hubig 2007, pp. 147–163), which coincide with 
what is known as “adaptive management” in the sustainability 
discourse (Walker et al. 2013; Kwakkel et al. 2016).
It is necessary to consider higher-level values in the evalua-
tion of socio-technical options of action to preserve the condi-
tions for such a prudent approach at the individual and institu-
tional level. The consideration of these option and bequest val-
ues (Hubig 2007, pp. 137–146), which are intended to enable 
decision-making individuals and institutions, need not be legit-
imized by a majority within a discursive process, but can be sub-
jected to each person willing to act. The estimation of the poten-
tial endangerment of criteria that enable a decision-maker to es-
tablish a self-determined relation to a situation must therefore be 
included and spelled out in TA practice in any specific case. Ac-
cordingly, from a prudence-ethical point of view, the avoidance 
of systematic constraints, the avoidance of restrictions on actors 
and decision-making capabilities, as well as the preservation of 
revisability and compensability must become a central value 
in the design of socio-technical systems. If these process-ori-
ented criteria remain a matter of subjective value assessments of 
discourse participants in multi-criteria decision analyses in TA 
there is a danger to the possibility of acting in accordance with 
a well-funded precautionary principle and thus jeopardize the 
conditions of the possibility of responsible action (Kornwachs 
2000). A good example for such a problem is the development 
of the transport system in Germany: With regard to these high-
er-level values and criteria, there never should have been such 
a one-sided, coercive transport policy which is now hardly able 
to react to uprising problems like climate change, lack of urban 
space, noise pollution, etc. (Bangert 2017).
Conclusion
I demonstrated that sustainability conflicts are characterized 
by normative and epistemic uncertainties. In most cases, this 
makes purpose-oriented conflict management, which is typi-
7   These rules for dealing with dissent are in accord with the tradition of René 
Descartes’ provisional morality. He drafted his maxims in the face of the abo-
lition of traditional instances of orientation in the early 17th century, so that 
he would not remain indecisive in his actions, while reason obliged him to be 
so in his judgments ( Descartes 1637/2011, p. 41).
cal for modern societies, difficult. Where the usual utility-ori-
ented procedures for dealing with these conflicts are still used, 
a loss of acceptance and post-democratic tendencies can be ob-
served due to the lacking legitimacy of decisions reached in this 
way. However, the solution to install benevolent tyrants, who, 
inspired by the right insight, make decisions guided by a well-
founded responsibility for the future, brings along serious prob-
lems. In view of various forms of non-knowledge regarding fu-
ture developments, there is a danger of centralistic errors that 
could lead to far worse conditions than those currently prevail-
ing. In any case, the striving for consensus as a guarantee for the 
possibility of purpose-rational action at the societal level proves 
to be an unredeemable claim in most sustainability issues. Thus, 
competing social technologies for dealing with conflicts should 
not be evaluated on this basis.
In the spirit of a provisional morality, however, we can reflect 
on the limits of our power to act and envisage rules that should 
enable good action despite the uncertain decision-making situ-
ation. Here, the orientation towards prudence ethics reveals it-
self as a promising alternative, since it does not come up with 
the problematic universality claim of moral and technical im-
peratives, but rather aims to preserve the conditions of the pos-
sibility of practice as such (Luckner 2005, pp. 39–45). This re-
sults in process-oriented criteria beyond utility values that can 
be used to evaluate techniques for dealing with sustainability 
conflicts.
Criteria such as flexibility, error-friendliness, compensability, 
reversibility, transparency, or the avoidance of constraints speak 
in favor of conflict management on the basis of democratic in-
stitutions and against any form of centralism (Ott 2014). In short, 
this defines the preservation of the capacity to act. However, 
discourse boundaries in the form of a restriction of democratic 
participation and decision-making must be observed to prevent 
counterintuitive results of decisions made by the majority. The 
justification of these limits based on the prudence-ethical prin-
ciple of the preservation of practice comes with fewer difficul-
ties than strategies of justification based on duty-oriented  ethics 
and utilitarianism. In conclusion, the appropriate response to a 
swan song for democratic institutions in the face of an impend-
ing climate catastrophe and comparable dangers would be the 
foundation and/or strengthening of institutions which ensure the 
possibility of future (democratic) statecraft8.
8   If these institutions already exist as deliberative intermediate realms 
(Ott 2014) – including the practice of technology assessment – or whether 
they must first be created as environmental councils (Gesang 2014) must 
be clarified elsewhere.
Orientation towards prudence ethics aims to preserve the conditions 
of the possibility of practice as such.
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